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Philosophical discussions of the moralization of anger have not, to date, substantively engaged 
classical Chinese thought. This is unfortunate, given the abundance of appeals to moral anger in 
the classical literature, especially among the Confucians, and the suppression, expression, and 
functionalization of anger. Accordingly, this essay engages in two general projects: one 
interpretive, one applied. The interpretive project examines the manner in which classical 
Confucian thought regards anger as having both destructive and constructive aspects, how these 
aspects are unavoidable human experiences, and how they can (and should) be regulated or 
recruited by ritualized social forms. Specifically, while the early Confucians at times depict 
anger as a precarious feeling to be assuaged, there are circumstances in which anger is not only 
understandable, but morally warranted. In this tradition, adherence to ritual prescriptions is a 
primary means by which problematic anger is alleviated while moral anger is effectively 
expressed, achieving prosocial ends without producing undue harm. This understanding and 
analysis of anger from a Confucian perspective gives rise to an applied project that considers 
how even contemporary, non-Confucians can ritualize and deploy anger for positive moral and 
political ends. In particular, I examine how forms of reconciliation, etiquette, and protest can be 
construed as rituals through which moral anger is effectively channeled. 
 
The Interpretive Project 
 
A History of Anger 
 
The flourishing period of classical Confucianism is traditionally dated between the fifth and third 
centuries BCE, originating with the teachings of Confucius (Kongzi 孔子 or “Master Kong,” 
551-479 BCE) and extending through the Warring States Period (~475-221 BCE) of China’s 
history. In many ways, Confucianism’s rise and development are reactionary to this era of mass 
civil war: against a backdrop of bloodshed, corruption, and decay, Confucianism advocated 
philosophical and political resolutions to the widespread chaos. These resolutions were intended 
not merely to establish sociopolitical order, but to promote flourishing and harmony throughout 
the realm. To this end, one of the foci of the Confucian ethical-political project was the aim of 
establishing communities whose members could harmoniously coexist, a goal that required 
means for handling potentially disruptive dispositions including sorrow (ai 哀), disgust (wu 惡) 
and, most importantly for present purposes, anger (nu 怒).1, 2 
 It will likely come as no shock that the early Confucians recognized anger’s propensity 
for driving humans to violent and morally problematic actions and outlooks; anger has a 
destructive aspect. For example, Mengzi (Meng Ke 孟軻, 372-289 BCE) claims that a mark of 
moral goodness is that one does not “store up” anger against siblings and regards them 
affectionately (Mengzi 5A3, 9.3/47/12).3 Clinging to the anger, allowing it to build up over time, 
increases the likelihood of one becoming violent or distant, even with one’s kin.4 Additionally, 
anger is sometimes regarded as a cause of clouded judgement, and so cannot be a consistently 
reliable resource for determining best courses of action. Similar to Mengzi, Xunzi (Xun Kuang 
荀況, 3rd C. BCE) acknowledges that acting on (or in) anger can lead to deleterious 
consequences. In particular, Xunzi urges rulers that self-restraint is of utmost importance when 
angered, especially in the application of punishment (e.g. Xunzi 24/118/18, 24/119/3), or when 
hearing from subordinates (Xunzi 27/127/18).5 Thus, even though one feels anger, that anger 
cannot be allowed to drive one to violence or foolishness; a more calculated, level-headed way of 
engaging with the world is ideal (e.g., Xunzi 31/147/17-18). One should aim to restrain oneself 
and behave in a manner that is conducive to civility and harmony.6 
Given such rebukes of anger, it might come as a surprise to find that early Confucians, 
while emphasizing moral cultivation, political order, and social harmony, are not wholly averse 
to endorsing anger. Contrary to schools of thought that call for strict purgation of disruptive 
emotions, such as certain strands of Buddhism and Daoism, the Confucians instead look on anger 
as a basic, natural human disposition; that is, part of being human simply is having and 
experiencing anger.7 Consequently, the Confucians do not regard anger as being inherently 
morally bad. In point of fact, several historical figures that the Confucians depict as moral 
exemplars are described as faultlessly displaying anger in their moral endeavors. Of particular 
note are Wen and Wu, the first kings of the Zhou Dynasty, whose culture the early Confucians 
claim as a recurring source of inspiration. According to Mengzi, Wen, with a display of anger, 
could provide tranquility for all in the realm, a trait shared by his successor: 
If there was a single villain in the realm, then King Wu was ashamed. This was 
the courage of King Wu, and with just one show of anger he was able to pacify 
the people of the realm. (Mengzi 1B3, 2.3/8/31) 
Xunzi offers similar praise: 
When King Wu of Zhou was stirred to anger  
To the fields of Mu he brought his army.  
The soldiers of [Tyrant] Zhou changed their direction.  
(Xunzi 25/120/8-9, Hutton trans., modified, 264) 
Kwong-loi Shun suggests that this appeal to anger is akin to moral outrage that manifests by 
spurring one to action to rectify unjust or immoral circumstances (2015, 314). The invocation of 
Wu’s anger in these passages, then, does not necessarily refer to any sort of blind or bodily rage, 
nor is it necessarily associated with an intent to harm or do ill to another person. Rather, it is a 
rectificatory anger aimed at promoting pro-moral and harmonious political ends. In this sense, 
anger also has a constructive aspect. 
Before proceeding further with this analysis, it will help to distinguish anger from a 
disposition like rage (fen 忿). Rage, which the Confucians treat as a disposition unto itself, is 
typically depicted as sudden and severe, its expression akin to an outburst or a tantrum (Analects 
12.21/33/1-3). Rage is a moment of being mindlessly incensed. Anger, on the other hand, can 
endure and even possess intellectual qualities (e.g., the aforementioned aim of moral or political 
rectification). One feels a burst of rage when being cut off in traffic; one feels a seething anger 
when one is faced with systematic abuse by a (toxic) friend. In the former case, the feeling is 
immediate and violent, but tends to pass not long after the incident.8 In the latter case, however, 
the feeling can wax and wane, but nonetheless persist indefinitely and be accompanied by 
thoughts about the nature of the abuse that give rise to a variety of psychological complexes. The 
two can co-occur and may influence one another, but are nonetheless distinct dispositions. 
Returning to the Confucian notion of anger proper: the regard for anger as a response that 
moral exemplars may rightly have suggested that the Confucians were not mere pacifist 
pedants,9 but scholarly advocates for what they perceived as positive social transformation. 
While stopping far short of advancing a democratic or revolutionary political theory, the appeals 
to the anger of Wen and Wu imply that the Confucians perceive an imperative to strive for what 
is morally righteous, and that anger can serve as a legitimate motivating force for one’s 
striving.10 The relevant passages also imply that even the mere display of anger, if it be truly in 
the right, is sufficient to at least begin a social project of correction, culminating in harmony.11 
Why, however, ought one to think that anger, which can have destructive and disruptive 
properties, is conducive to such an ethical-political project? To answer this question, it will help 
to understand the Confucian treatment of anger as a natural and inalienable feature of human 
living. 
 
Anger as Natural Response 
 
The classical Confucian account of the origin of anger is an appropriate topic with which to 
begin this deeper enquiry. As noted earlier, anger is thought by the Confucians to originate as 
one of the most basic dispositions of the human psyche.12 Xunzi in particular explicitly suggests 
that, while proper control over such dispositions is quintessential to flourishing, so too is 
accommodating and nourishing them (Xunzi 17/80/9-15).13 Consequently, the Confucians regard 
anger as an inherent feature of the human experience: being human includes not only the 
capacity to feel anger, but actually experiencing it and living both with and through it.  
Giving anger a natural status has interesting implications for how the Confucians deal 
with this disposition that can be destructive and antisocial. The early Confucians adopt the stance 
that the human being, both in terms of the corporeal body and vital energies (qi 氣), should be 
kept healthy and intact when possible as part of a more general pursuit of flourishing.14 This 
view is plausibly a source of inspiration for Mengzi’s remarks about the need for moral 
cultivation to align (in some manner) with facts about human psychological constitution: 
Is one able, simply by following [its nature], to make the willow tree into cups 
and bowls? Surely one must forcefully injure and steal from the willow tree and 
only then can one make cups and bowls. If one must, by forcefully injuring and 
stealing from the willow tree, make cups and bowls [from it], then must one also 
forcefully injure and steal from humans in order to make them benevolent and 
righteous? How swiftly, then, would all the people in the world come to regard 
benevolence and righteousness as calamities! (Mengzi 6A1, 11.1/56/17-19, 
bracketed text added) 
Mengzi claims that any practices or methods adopted as part of the moral cultivation process 
should respect the integrity of the human being. If moral cultivation were to work violently 
against the most fundamental human dispositions, then it would inevitably do harm to humans by 
mutilating them at their core. Anger is among one’s natural dispositions, so trying to eliminate 
anger would be akin to mutilating oneself. Consequently, the feeling of anger should not be 
eliminated, but accommodated and, at least in a sense, even nourished.15 
A further upshot of this view is that anger is not inherently associated with moral 
badness; again, anger can be constructive and conducive to moral progress, as with the 
campaigns of Wen and Wu. It is important to qualify, though, that anger’s place in Confucianism 
is complex: anger’s moral valence is often dependent on things like setting and the manner in 
which it is exhibited. For the Confucians, whether anger is conducive or counterproductive to 
moral aims is a function of context. Specifically, if anger is enacted in the appropriate setting and 
in the appropriate way, then the overarching moral performance is good; if anger is enacted in 
either an inappropriate setting or inappropriate manner, then the performance is morally 
problematic. Consider Confucius’s handling of his brash student Zilu (子路): though loyal, Zilu 
is depicted as prone to aggressive displays, a trait that Zilu considered conducive to directing the 
military. When Zilu implies that he would be an ideal companion to serve alongside Confucius in 
commanding an army, however, Confucius subtly admonishes him: 
One who would wrestle a tiger or gallop through a river, who would die without 
regret: I would not associate with such a person. The one with whom I would 
associate would serve cautiously, be good at strategy, and complete his tasks. 
(Analects 7.11/15/17-18) 
Zilu’s fault lies not in his willingness to fight, but in the lack of gravity he affords violent 
conflict. This implies a lack of restraint analogous to what Xunzi warns against: even in cases 
where one might be (rightly) angered, to act without restraint or calculation is still to act poorly. 
It is not necessarily morally wrong to become angry; however, it can be morally wrong to act on 
that anger without due consideration of other morally salient features, and so the early 
Confucians do not license completely giving over to anger. Again, feelings of anger are an 
inevitability of human living, are motivating, and can even be morally appropriate, but anger 
should never be the sole basis of one’s actions; moral goodness demands that one act in a way 
that advances personal and interpersonal flourishing, and anger can stymie this pursuit. 
 In order to further flesh out the nuances of anger’s functionality in the Confucian 
account, it will help to look at the circumstances in which anger is conducive to psychological 
and social flourishing. For one, given that it is a basic feature of human experience, humans must 
be allowed displays of anger as part of maintaining personal tranquility. Xunzi states that, “if 
people are not permitted displays of happiness or anger, then there will be chaos” (Xunzi 
20/99/25). If anger is “stored up,” as Mengzi says, then people become more prone to violent 
displays; thus, it is not in the interest either of the personal or relational health of humans to be 
prevented from showing anger. Accordingly, humans need outlets to express anger without 
disrupting relationships or the general community. 
 In addition to the practical necessity of anger, multiple passages list anger as a disposition 
that moral exemplars both possess and deploy in appropriate scenarios. Xunzi describes this facet 
of anger in reference to the exemplar kings of old:  
Thus, it was by music that the former kings ornamented their happiness; it was by 
military campaigns and weaponry that the former kings ornamented their anger, 
and so the former kings’ happiness and anger both were equally achieved. Thus, 
when they were happy all under heaven was at peace; when angry, the violent and 
chaotic were made fearful. This was the way of the former kings, and ritual and 
music are its zenith. (Xunzi 20/99/10-12)16 
Along with the aforementioned passage discussing the exploits of Wen and Wu, the anger of the 
exemplar kings more generally is treated as a virtue unto itself, as it was deployed to both 
express righteous attitudes, and quell chaos and ill intent in the realm. 
In particular, this feature of anger helps to manifest the additional virtue of “courage” 
(yong 勇) displayed by Wen and Wu. While an account of courage in the Confucian tradition can 
be provided without referencing anger, it is arguable that anger, or some form of it, is recruited 
into certain expressions of courage that appear in classical Confucian thought. As Shun explains: 
[O]n the Confucian view, when one is wrongfully injured, the focus of one’s 
attention should be on the ethical quality of one’s response rather than on how 
one’s standing is challenged by the offender. One may respond with anger to the 
ethically problematic quality of the situation…But, ideally, there should not be an 
additional element of the response that is directed to the way one’s standing has 
been challenged because, on the Confucian view, one’s standing is a matter of 
one’s own ethical qualities rather than the way one is viewed or treated by others. 
(2014, 29-30) 
Shun’s explanation emphasizes a Confucian belief that, ideally, one’s emotional and behavioral 
responses should focus on moving forward in life and not dwelling on how an injury challenges 
one’s own standing. Were one to stew in or store up that anger, then one would risk becoming 
fixated and mired in the situation. This, in turn, increases the risk of one’s otherwise moral anger 
devolving into base malice that could lead to ignoble action, which would exemplify mere 
animosity rather than courage. Confucian courage, then, can be understood in part as the 
harnessing of anger not for petty vengeance, but as a motivator for moral rectification. 
The ability of Wen and Wu to pacify the realm in a display of anger is exemplary of such 
cultivation and is said by Mengzi to mark a morally “great” form of courage (dayong 大勇) that 
is distinct from “petty courage” (xiaoyong 小勇). Mere petty courage is concerned with 
maintaining exterior shows of honor (e.g., responding to insult or steeling one’s will), while great 
courage is oriented toward maintaining and perpetuating moral goodness. Moreover, and as P. J. 
Ivanhoe notes, “one of the characteristic features of great courage is that those who possess it 
know that they are in the right and justified in their cause” (2006, 224). Ivanhoe’s addition 
reinforces the idea that great courage links moral righteousness and the aforementioned form of 
anger that is focused on making good on that attitude. Indeed, such anger, in the service of 
courage, might even be morally requisite.  
It is clear, then, that the early Confucians regard anger as playing an important role in 
bringing about personal flourishing and positive social transformation. Again, though, it is 
necessary to emphasize that this moral anger is distinct from petty and problematic cases of 
anger. Furthermore, moral anger is not merely something that manifests and is to be deployed 
spontaneously. Rather, the anger is to be felt, directed, and deployed in manners that further the 




Before explaining how the Confucians advocate giving anger proper form, it will help to clarify 
the Confucian notion of ritual. While the character translated as “ritual” (li 禮) originally referred 
to sacrificial practices (e.g., to one’s ancestors), by the time it came into use by the Confucians 
its meaning had broadened to a number of other activities and standards (including ranks, 
etiquette, and general expectations in relationships).18 According to the Confucians, these rituals 
originated from the efforts of ancient, exemplar kings who, in the interest of promoting harmony 
and flourishing for the population, established and implemented the rituals so as to both provide 
for social order and help fulfill individual psychosocial needs.19 The claim is not that these 
rituals are magical, but that they provide real, meaningful ways of recruiting, coordinating, or 
working through various human dispositions and interactions. Confucius himself establishes a tie 
between this concept of ritual and an overarching ethical ideal of ren (仁), variously translated as 
“benevolence” or “humaneness” (e.g., Analects 3.3, 12.1). Coupled with the fact that ren is 
depicted as caring for others (Analects 12.22), and that such care is plausibly construed as a 
matter of acknowledging, taking seriously, and responding accordingly to a person’s worth,20 I 
suggest understanding Confucian rituals as prescriptions governing the practices and standards 
that embody expressions of respect and related humane attitudes.21 
 Having said this, it may not be immediately clear how anger can be ritualized as part of a 
prosocial project: does caring for others not preclude feelings of enmity? Anyone who is or has 
ever been a parent or teacher is likely to respond to this question with an emphatic “no,” as those 
to whom care is directed can behave in ways that frustrate (and even infuriate) their caregivers. 
Indeed, the Confucians seem all too aware of this fact, as Mengzi indicates in his explanation for 
the practice of having a son’s moral education be conducted by someone other than his father: 
One [who teaches] must teach what is correct. If what one teaches as correct is not 
carried out, then one is sure to foster anger. If one fosters anger then, contrarily, 
one produces animosity. [The student sees this and says,] “He teaches what is 
correct, yet he himself does not yet follow what is correct.” Consequently, this 
results in mutual animosity between father and son. When father and son have 
mutual animosity, the result is badness. Those of the past exchanged their sons 
and taught them, so that between father and son there were no admonitions about 
goodness; such admonitions cause estrangement, and there is no greater 
misfortune than estrangement [between father and son]. (Mengzi 4A18, 7.18/39/1-
3, bracketed text added) 22 
Mengzi’s explanation is interesting because it speaks not only to the inevitability of anger toward 
a deviant child or student, but also to the appropriateness of that anger. If a student, on receiving 
instruction, goes on to act contrarily to what is correct, then the teacher cannot but be aggrieved. 
According to the passage, in such cases it is not merely that the student has erred in trying to put 
what is correct into practice; the student has also acted without respect for the instruction.23 This 
sentiment is further clarified in the Liji (“Neize 內則” passage 17), in which it is made explicit 
that rejection of instruction should move a parent to anger (although expression of said anger 
should be private, not public). This is because such rejection is not only an affront to the teacher, 
but to the values and prescriptions encoded in the instruction. As such, the teacher’s anger 
reflects not merely indignation, but moral righteousness since, from the Confucian perspective, 
the teacher has a moral obligation to instill said values and prescriptions in the student. 
 At the same time, the passage reflects the fact that the Confucians do not license all 
displays of anger, as even a novice is capable of discerning the inappropriateness of showing 
animosity. The important distinction here is that it is not anger itself that is problematic, but what 
anger can sometimes incite: estrangement, abuse, injury, and general badness. Hence, Xunzi 
counsels against a “moment’s anger” in favor of restraint (Xunzi 4/12/21) but does not insist on 
one’s living a life devoid of anger. The key is to provide the aforementioned means of guiding 
and accommodating anger in a way that does not provoke animosity but is conducive to moral 
aims. Learners must develop an ability to discern between morally destructive expressions of 
anger, and morally constructive expressions of anger. This is where the turn to ritual occurs. 
 For Xunzi, and Confucius as well, ritual is key to moral cultivation.24 According to 
Xunzi, at birth humans lack the resources for (harmoniously) coping with and responding to a 
variety of hardships including emotionally disruptive scenarios, being without sufficient 
sustenance, and even generally interacting with others. When confronted with such 
circumstances, humans may deploy (and even tend toward) chaotic or ethically problematic 
behaviors: attacking others out of grief, stealing from others in desperation, and being generally 
insensitive to the wellbeing of others. By nature, Xunzi claims, humans are effectively morally 
incompetent. It is only by learning, practicing, and appreciating ritual that one becomes a fully 
realized moral person (e.g., Xunzi 1/3/10-11). Xunzi illustrates this with the metaphors of 
shaping and honing, comparing human nature to crooked wood and blunt metal, and claiming 
that humans must therefore be rectified with instruction in ritual and righteousness (Xunzi 
23/113/9–10). Ritual helps organize, coordinate, and even prime affective responses to these 
sorts of scenarios, restructuring a learner’s psychological landscape by helping to inculcate 
responses to, and understandings of, a variety of ethically charged situations. 
 Of additional interest is ritual’s ability to channel and refine dispositions to make them 
appropriate, tolerable, and comprehensible to oneself and others in various situations. Similar to 
how mastering a verbal language aids one’s analysis of both the world and oneself, ritual 
facilitates moral development by prescribing norms that are then assimilated into one’s sense of 
moral judgement (Xunzi 4/15/13–17).25 Xunzi’s program uses ritual to refine one’s sense of 
judgement in a way that enhances self and social awareness when seeking to fulfill one’s 
dispositional desires, helping to achieve harmony. When deliberating whether or how to act on a 
disposition, one is subject to the cultivated sense of moral judgement as framed by social ritual. 
Establishing these norms throughout a community via ritual sets a basis for moral order. 
 Accordingly, Xunzi claims that it is by ritual that proper limits and form are given to 
anger (19/92/5). This reflects ritual’s general function: providing models for social harmony. 
Admittedly, Xunzi rarely explicitly connects anger and ritual, but there are several occasions 
where his language harkens to this connection. For example, Xunzi states that 
When angry, [the noble person] is not excessively harsh… [and such a person] is 
not excessively harsh when angry…because adherence to the proper model 
overcomes any selfishness. (Xunzi 2/8/13-15, Hutton trans. modified, 15). 
As evinced in several other passages, the models to which Xunzi refers are the rituals (e.g., Xunzi 
1/3/7-12, 2/8/4, 12/60/10, 17/82/22-17/83/1, 19/92/16-17, 23/114/10-11). This is a common 
styling for Xunzi, who occasionally relates the function of ritual to other types of standards, such 
as measurements and blueprints. For example, when speaking of the noble scholar, Xunzi 
describes such a person as one who dwells within an edifice of ritual (e.g., Xunzi 19/95/15, 
8/34/20-24), and suggests that rituals also provide guidance as sorts of social “depth markers” 
(Xunzi 17/82/22-17/83/1). The wording depicts ritual as something that enables practitioners to 
move and work through both the social world and internal psychological struggles, giving 
helpful direction as well as shape to their thoughts, attitudes, and actions. 
 It is plausible, then, that Xunzi’s general treatment of ritual, with its handling of 
dispositions, will have implications for anger. Consider Xunzi’s remarks on the different ritual 
prescriptions to which one should adhere for the various dispositions: music for joy, quasi-
asceticism for sorrow, and martial and corrective affairs for moral disdain.26 All of these 
prescriptions are established both to allow the expression and full experience of the relevant 
disposition in a manner that signals one’s dispositional state to others, and to allow one to have 
the experience in a manner that maintains both social and personal harmony. Such prescriptions 
can also nurture and accommodate anger, as noted in Xunzi’s previous connection between anger 
and how the former kings “ornamented” their anger with the military practices referenced herein, 
as well as the idea that anger is stirred by a moral violation. It is by means of the ritual forms, 
then, that the experience and expression of anger is facilitated so as to make it a constructive, 
promoral event, rather than a merely destructive one. 
 Unfortunately, neither Xunzi nor any of the other early Confucians detail specific rituals 
for anger, at least not for those who are in positions unsuitable for commanding armies.27 Rather, 
when detailing rituals that concern natural dispositions, Xunzi tends to focus on sorrow, 
especially in the case of lost loved ones. In an extended example, Xunzi goes into detail about 
the funeral rites for a deceased parent, discussing how one makes offerings to the deceased that 
they would have required in life, but only provides items that are well worn or imperfect in some 
significant way (Xunzi 19/95/9-13). The purpose is to simultaneously express reverence for the 
deceased and the grief of loss while also acknowledging that person’s passing and moving on 
accordingly.28 It is plausible that similar ritual prescriptions exist for coping with and expressing 
anger, even if the Confucians do not detail them in depth. Anger, much like sorrow or happiness, 
is an unavoidable human disposition, and so it is highly unlikely (perhaps impossible) that there 
would not be a ritual means of handling anger.  
What might such rituals look like, though? In addition to the use of reflection and 
calculation to pause one’s anger, I suggest that rituals dealing with the aforementioned virtue of 
courage (yong 勇), especially moral courage, are among those to which the Confucians appeal 
for handling and expelling anger. Specifically, I submit that it is through courage that anger is 
mobilized for moral ends. Recall that the ideal target of anger is something like immorality or 
injustice, suggesting that displays of great (i.e., moral) courage are those directed specifically 
against such moral badness (e.g., as with Wen and Wu). If this is an accurate understanding of 
the classical Confucian position, then it provides an additional hint as to what rituals of anger 
might look like for even a commoner: they are displays of righteousness in the face of moral 
adversity and, insofar as these rituals channel anger, the anger expressed is specifically moral 
anger; it is prosocial and conducive to justice.  
With this Confucian account of moral anger and ritual in hand, I turn to modernity and 
examine how rituals of the Confucian sort might be used to deploy anger for positive moral and 
political ends, particularly in terms of identifying and responding to immorality or injustice. 
 
The Applied Project 
 
Accepting Anger’s Place 
 
As mentioned previously, the early Confucian texts depict properly deployed, moral anger as 
having a role in projects of moral and political transformation and rectification. This account fits 
nicely with some of the contemporary work on anger. Helena Flam (2005, 2015), for example, 
has written extensively on the importance of “reclaiming” anger as a necessary part of achieving 
positive social change against an oppressive status quo. Additionally, Dirk Lindebaum and 
colleagues have argued for a kind of “moral anger” that stands distinct from other forms of 
anger, depicting this disposition as 
(i) an aroused emotional state stemming from (ii) a primary appraisal of a moral 
standard violation that (iii) impacts others more than oneself, and (iv) motivates 
corrective behaviour intended to improve the social condition, even in the face of 
significant personal risk. (Lindebaum and Geddes 2015, 6) 
Moral anger has two dimensions, one informative and the other energic. Moral anger is 
informative in the sense that it provides a source of appraisal, particularly with regard to the 
ethical nature of a scenario; it is energic in the sense that it moves one to act against an ethical 
breach (Lindebaum and Gabriel 2016, 904-905). Such features of moral anger clearly resonate 
with the Confucian depictions of kings Wen and Wu, whose actions are part of a broader 
narrative of rulers who work toward ethical-political rectification when they, infuriated by the 
maltreatment of their people by an uncaring authority, depose a tyrant and establish a kingdom 
on benevolent principles. This resonance further suggests that classical Confucian thought on 
moral anger is of interest even in modernity, particularly when considering how such anger can 
be harnessed through ritual forms to achieve ethical and political transformation that aims at 
personal flourishing and social harmony. 
I suspect that some readers will be wary of such a project: the idea that any social form 
(ritual or otherwise) could successfully allow one to experience, express, or work through one’s 
anger without disrupting harmony may seem laughable. After all, expressions of anger, even 
nonviolent ones, can serve as gateways to more problematic attitudes, such as Martha 
Nussbaum’s (2016) “payback” wish, which inclines its holders to exact some sort of vengeance 
on those who have wronged them. This retributive desire is morally problematic in its demand 
that, in order for one’s anger (inclusive of any moral aims) to be effectively expressed and 
appeased, one must necessarily do injury to others. If one must do injury to others in order to 
fully express one’s anger, however, then it seems unlikely that the anger’s expression can be 
compatible with the aim of social harmony.  
Moreover, there is a live concern that anger can trap its holders in a cycle: when anger 
results in action that does injury to others, then those others become aggrieved and respond in 
kind; the circle then perpetuates itself. This is made all the worse by the fact that anger motivates 
not only individually, but communally, and all those members of a group infected with anger 
become less receptive to those outside the group. Deborah Cantrell (2019) seizes on this fault to 
argue against the use of anger as a moral motivator, claiming 
that anger, at its core, is destructive and unhelpful…its goal is to inflict some kind 
of “payback” on another, which orients responsive action towards the past and not 
towards change going forward. (5) 
The cycle of anger can be regressive for the individual, trapping them in a state of feeling 
wronged and seeking retribution without offering any real means of moving forward even if such 
retribution is achieved. While it is right to call out injustice, which does not necessarily require a 
feeling of anger, it is not helpful to engage with attitudes that only serve to further disintegrate 
the threads of communality. Hence, anger looks to be incompatible with social harmony. 
 On the one hand, I am sympathetic to the concern that anger can be misplaced and 
destructive, even when the avowed sources and directions of the anger are morally oriented. For 
example, and as Cantrell aptly notes, violent protest, even if the cause is righteous, can alienate 
possible supporters (Ibid.), so one must be wary of anger. On the other hand, this line of thinking 
seems to minimize the fact that anger does admit of genres,29 and that developing an ability to 
discriminate among these genres is part of moral cultivation. Moreover, it is possible that many 
of the most problematic cases typically referred to as “anger” are, in fact, misidentified instances 
of what the Confucians might call “rage” (e.g., hurling a brick through a window during a tense 
demonstration). Distinctions must be drawn between mere frustration, reflexive tantrums, and 
genuine moral outage. This is a core feature of the overarching Confucian program which, as 
part of its ethical project, urges learners not to become stuck or fixated in their anger, but to 
move through (or with) it in a manner that is forward-looking and morally productive.  
A similar issue surrounds resentment (yuan 怨) which, in the Confucian tradition, is a 
kind of frustration with one’s circumstances that is phenomenologically similar to, though not 
necessarily the same as, anger (Ing 2016, p. 19; Sung forthcoming).30 While resentment is 
generally discouraged by the early Confucians,31 likely be due to the fact that it can inhibit 
prosociality by breeding contention between persons, it is not rejected outright. Winnie Sung 
argues (plausibly) that it is best to understand the Confucian position on resentment as permitting 
the experience of resentment while rejecting any clinging to said resentment, as this can prohibit 
one from flourishing or from contributing to the flourishing of others.32 Moreover, resentment is 
apparently endorsed when it is morally proper. Sung offers the example of Mengzi’s critiquing 
an officer who lacked resentment following his mistreatment by an unrighteous lord, a fault that 
Sung depicts as a lack of seriousness and that Mengzi refers to as a lack of (self-)respect (gong 
恭) (Mengzi 2A9, 3.9/18/29-30). Mengzi’s remarks reflect a general Confucian sentiment that, 
while ministers should demonstrate loyalty to their superiors, such loyalty cannot consist in mere 
toadying: when one witnesses or experiences impropriety, one ought to offer remonstration. His 
remarks also reflect the impression that resentment, at least in this case, provides a litmus test for 
one’s own moral understanding: if one is treated genuinely morally badly, then one ought to feel 
resentment, since the feeling of frustration indicates that something is ethically amiss.33  
Accordingly, while reducing resentment toward others is a general aim of the Confucian 
program, resentment is also construed as a feeling appropriate to certain circumstances when 
deployed righteously and in moderation.34 Anger, I suggest, has a similar function: generally, it 
is not ideal to hold anger against other humans, since it can devolve into more malicious 
attitudes. There are, however, circumstances in which it is both right and reasonable that one 
develops and expresses moral anger, such as when morality is breached. If this understanding is 
apt, then anger should be accorded a place as a judgemental disposition, even if it is not the sole 
or guiding one. The dangers of anger should not be construed as reasons to abandon anger itself; 
they are simply obstacles of which to be wary during moral cultivation. 
Furthermore, Cantrell’s suggestion that anger be rejected as a motivator for things like 
positive social change seems to run up against one of the core points of the Confucian project, 
namely that anger is a human disposition that needs to be accommodated. To clarify, Cantrell’s 
point is not that humans should not feel anger, but that humans should not look to anger as a 
primary motivator for things like social activism given its caustic nature. Nonetheless, I think 
that Cantrell’s strategy of replacing anger-as-motivator with other emotions, namely “fierce 
love” (2019, 30),35 is insufficient to handle the fact that most humans are prone to anger as a 
primary response to perceived injustice: simply because a different disposition is more prone to 
eliciting promoral results does not mean that anger has been overcome or expelled. Even if one 
were to adopt a more typically prosocial disposition, one will still need to have a means of 
structuring and handling anger when it arises. Such is the function of ritual. 
 
Moving Forward with Anger and Ritualized Righteousness 
 
What is left now is the matter of outlining rituals that can both promote sociomoral harmony and 
satisfy the disposition of moral anger.36 Recall that there are at least two forms of anger: 
destructive anger and constructive/moral anger. Destructive anger is, in a sense, untethered: 
stewing in it, it boils over, and can erupt as morally problematic animus. Such anger is 
destructive, so it should either be harnessed for constructive ends or, failing that, moved through 
effectively and peaceably. For anger of this sort, the Confucians recommend engaging 
specifically in reflection (si 思) as part of ritual (e.g., Xunzi 22/110/17–18). Reflection involves a 
number of cognitive and metacognitive capacities, including contemplation, deliberation, 
reminiscence, and even visualization. Reflection demands that one halt one’s action and engage 
in circumspection that includes the nature of the perceived injury and what sort of response is 
warranted. Again, and as noted earlier, this response should be forward-looking and should help 
to move one away from a static focus on injury. In so doing, one’s anger is (ideally) quelled at 
least to the degree that it prevents violence, thus ending the destructive threat. 
Moral anger, however, will not be pacified simply by reflection, since one discerns that a 
genuine moral wrong has been committed. How ought one work with such a disposition? There 
are, I think, obvious ways of using ritual simply to help negotiate and dispense with anger via 
participation in an activity that allows one to either move through or convert one’s anger into 
another disposition. Informally, this is sometimes pursued by doing things like vigorous exercise: 
running, weightlifting, and sparring are all instances where both reflexive and moral anger can be 
allowed to burn until one attains a calmer mind. This by no means entails that one relinquishes 
one’s sense that moral wrongdoing has occurred and needs to be addressed, but it provides time 
to focus and transmute anger, and possibly move away from more violent urges. As Xunzi notes, 
such rituals are not only proper outlets for one’s dispositions, but also morally appropriate in 
their conduciveness to prosocial ends.37 For grief, one might engage in ritual wailing, fasting, or 
seclusion among other practices that allow one to live through the disruptive experience. It is 
probable that anger can be handled in a similar manner: exclamations, vigorous physical 
displays, and temporarily distancing oneself from others can all help with working through the 
bodily aspects of experiencing anger.  
Perhaps a more formal, ritualized practice that could serve moral anger is the writing, but 
not sending, of angry, condemnatory letters.38 Maria Konnikova documents several famous 
examples of such “hot letters”: 
Harry S. Truman once almost informed the treasurer of the United States that “I 
don’t think that the financial advisor of God Himself would be able to understand 
what the financial position of the Government of the United States is, by reading 
your statement.” In 1922, Winston Churchill nearly warned Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George that when it came to Iraq, “we are paying eight millions a year for 
the privilege of living on an ungrateful volcano out of which we are in no 
circumstances to get anything worth having.” Mark Twain all but chastised 
Russians for being too passive when it came to the czar’s abuses, writing, 
“Apparently none of them can bear to think of losing the present hell entirely, 
they merely want the temperature cooled down a little.” (2014) 
To clarify, the hot letter is not merely a case of one rapidly penning a note and then crumpling it 
up and tossing it away (else there would not be treasure troves of unsent missives). One actually 
sits down to compose a formal letter in which one fully and unequivocally expresses one’s 
thoughts and feelings on the source of moral outrage. In so doing, one becomes creatively, 
intellectually engaged with one’s anger, and possibly facilitates a shift away from rage. 
The practice and effects of hot letter writing are comparable to the way in which one uses 
ritual sacrifices and offerings to the deceased to work through sorrow: just as one knows 
(intellectually) that the offerings will not actually be used by the deceased, it brings one a sense 
of fulfillment all the same; similarly, simply writing the letter may be sufficient to express and 
work through the brunt of one’s moral outrage. As one allows the excess of energy generated by 
one’s anger to dissipate, one is left bodily calmer and less distracted by the immediate sensation 
of the metaphorical fire in one’s belly. This allows one to turn one’s attention fully to the 
intellectual aspect of one’s moral anger and proceed accordingly. 
There are also several ways in which ritual can help to navigate and actively deploy 
moral anger for the purpose of moral rectification, even for those unable to deploy militaries to 
pacify (and correct) the unrighteous; that is to say, ritual forms can be applied to harness one’s 
moral anger and more directly address wrongdoing. Both the Analects (14.21/39/6-11) and the 
Liji (“Neize” passage 18), for example, depict cases of remonstrating with authority figures when 
one thinks morality has been upended: it is to be done respectfully, even reverentially, but if one 
encounters wrongdoing, then there is both reason and protocol to make clear one’s concerns.39 In 
modernity, this might take the form of structured disputation or some sort of reconciliatory 
practice. Even if such interactions fail to result in immediate transformation, it is still better to 
express the anger and make the problem known than to sit by and do nothing, which could allow 
the transgression to persist or for one’s own anger to possibly fester and revert to reflexive, 
destructive anger. 
A practice that could benefit from (or coopt) such ritual treatments of anger is the modern 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). TRCs are typically developed and deployed for 
the purpose of creating historical accounts of, and assisting in the healing process for, those 
affected by widespread or national atrocities (e.g., Apartheid in South Africa or the Residential 
Schools Settlement Agreement in Canada), and for promoting reconciliation between involved 
parties.40 TRCs offer an opportunity for reparative or restorative justice, as opposed to retributive 
approaches to justice that may engender further conflict among parties. As such, TRCs are 
increasingly popular and have been touted as active and effective contributors both to reconciling 
and unifying society generally, as well as to democratization specifically (e.g., Gibson 2006). 
In some ways, TRCs are already ritualized spaces, offering a variety of practices and 
settings that are made sacred by the prescriptions placed on what is to be shared and how. Citing 
the description of the Canadian TRCs, Anne-Marie Reynaud reports the following instructions: 
Survivors or intergenerational victims are to speak of their residential school 
experiences and their impacts, or of reconciliation. They should try to respect the 
15-minute time frame. There is available health support for all. The tears 
witnesses "shed without shame" are healing…and not garbage. Therefore, the 
tissues people use are not to be thrown away but collected and burnt in the sacred 
fire. She reminded the audience that this room is a witness of sacred 
sharings…and that the TRC is independent from the government. It is necessary, 
she also said, not to name an aggressor if this person has not been to court or if 
they are not dead. (2014, 374) 
This approach to constructing the space of the TRC employs the sorts of prescriptions that would 
be considered ritual on the Confucian account: they delineate roles and responsibilities, cover 
specific practices and rules of decorum, and aim at establishing and preserving respect. 
Despite the appeal of TRCs, however, their actual efficacy in helping victims recover 
from their traumas remains unclear. In particular, while TRCs arguably provide a space in which 
to work toward reconciliation between victim and victimizer, it is not obvious that these spaces 
truly or fully accommodate the particular material or emotional needs of those who have been 
victimized, including their anger. In fact, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, architect of the TRCs in 
South Africa, effectively condemns the presence of anger in such spaces, claiming that  
Anything that subverts or undermines this sought-after good [of reconciliation] is 
to be avoided like the plague. Anger, resentment, lust for revenge, even success 
through aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive of this good (1999, 34).  
This construal and treatment of victims’ anger is problematic for a number of reasons. First, and 
most obviously, it makes fully speaking truth difficult for victims who carry anger. These victims 
are prohibited from displaying, understanding, or validating their full range of emotions when 
restrictions are placed not only on what they are allowed say, but how they are allowed to say it. 
If anger is indeed caustic, as is suggested by scholars like Cantrell, Nussbaum, and Tutu, then it 
is best to alleviate this burden, rather than suppress it and thereby saddle the victims with 
additional pressure. Moreover, there is no evidence to date that TRCs effectively purge this 
feeling anyway (e.g., Flam 2013, Mendeloff 2009, Reynaud 2014). Consequently, even when 
TRCs are ritualized, it is not clear that they are presently effective rituals, at least insofar as their 
aim is to assist in healing and anger is indicative of injury. 
Second, such construals assume that anger is necessarily divisive and caustic, and such a 
characterization ignores the fact that anger may vary in genre. Anger does not have to be 
destructive or divisive; it can, as I have argued throughout this essay, also be conducive to moral 
projects.41 Indeed, in her interviews with survivors who attended the Canadian TRCs, Reynaud 
notes that, although the events did little to alleviate their anger, none of the victims expressed 
anything akin to Nussbaum’s payback wish (378), and some even refused to relinquish their 
anger on the grounds that it was part of both their personal healing process as well as the way 
forward in terms of eliminating systemic injustices (376). This is more in line with the moral 
anger that I have attributed to the Confucians: it is an anger that arises in response to moral 
transgressions and moves one to seek rectification or transformation of those individuals or 
systems responsible. As such, the moral anger depicted herein need not be construed as 
retributive or at odds with reparative/restorative justice. On the contrary, its aims are 
reparative/restorative, as the ethical-political project is pro-, rather than anti-, social. 
My suggestion, then, is that TRCs can benefit from maintaining their ritualized 
atmosphere, but ought to alter the rituals (or provide additional rituals) such that they embrace 
anger and empower victims, rather than aim to snuff out their fire. This means that the ritual 
space of the TRC must be carefully constructed such that the ritual forms on offer 
simultaneously maintain an atmosphere of respect without invalidating the emotions of those 
offering testimony. For example, in the ritual of deposition it may help to emphasize that not 
only are speakers’ words valued, but that their tone and nonverbal expressions are also valued by 
those in attendance; this must be so regardless of the nature of the emotion behind the 
expression, since that emotion is equally part of their testimony, their truth. Consequently, it 
would be wrong to censure those who express anger, especially since such expressions often 
reflect the very sort of distress that indicates an obstacle to reconciliation.  
More effectively ritualizing TRCs also means being highly sensitive to the particular 
needs of those who would give testimony. Continuing with the example of the Canadian TRCs, 
Reynaud notes that the event, held at the Queen Mary Hotel in Montreal, was perceived as 
deeply problematic due to the Crown’s role in perpetuating the target injustice, as well as the 
irony of sealing a “ritual” box containing written testimonials that had been “boxed-in” for so 
long (p. 378). Although the event and the ritual were both well-intentioned, they overlooked 
crucial features of the interaction between symbols (the name of the hotel and the sealing of the 
box) with the nature of the injustice (the government-sanctioned abuse of aboriginal peoples and 
the invalidation of their anguish). Following the Confucian guidelines, the ritual space should be 
selected or designed such that the space “fits” the circumstances, including the attitudes of those 
who have been injured. Additionally, any particular rituals that are incorporated into the TRC 
should be devised with an awareness of power dynamics; they should aim to maximally 
empower victims so that they are able to more effectively harness and express their full truths 
(again, inclusive of emotions like anger) and to avoid diminishing victims or their feelings. Such 
rituals can assist in harnessing anger and working directly toward its aim of moral rectification. 
There are also less institutional ways of ritualizing moral anger that carry their own 
nuances. The Confucians, for example, tend to disparage the use of overt insults in direct 
confrontation with wrongdoers, but they do not shy away from expressing strong disapproval of 
wrongdoing by appeal to historical analogs. In several passages (e.g., Analects 3.1, 3.2), 
Confucius comments on the behaviors of the three great ministerial families in his home state 
who, in their hubris, carry on as if they carry the authority of not only dukes, but kings. When 
doing so, he does not engage in mere name-calling, but by identifying specific practices and 
alluding to how they, culturally or historically, reflect breaches of propriety. In other words, the 
wrongdoing is set specifically within the context of ritual or, perhaps more accurately, its 
transgression; it is a subtle “call-out” on wrongdoing. The philosophy behind such an approach is 
similar to Karen Stohr’s (2006) account of the manner in which etiquette functions as the 
primary vehicle by which moral sentiments and attitudes are expressed. According to Stohr, 
there is a very real sense in which being a moral person requires one to understand and adopt 
social conventions as part of the expression and exchange of moral sentiments. This is not to 
suggest that morality is simply conventionalism: rather, as Stohr points out, “the conventions are 
the starting point.... The thought may be what counts, but the vehicle for expressing it is itself 
part of the thought” (195). These etiquette conventions, then, are integral to proper moral 
practice and serve an important role in coordinating affect and action.  
An approach of effectively calling out breaches of propriety/ritual thus reflects the 
aforementioned informative aspect of moral anger on two levels. On the one hand, appeal to 
ritual can enable expression of one’s own moral outrage; on the other, it can reflect the thought 
that there is a sociohistorical explanation for why one is morally outraged and makes this 
explanation public. This is an interesting tactic for expressing moral anger, as it places the 
object(s) of anger in an interesting position: if they are to (meaningfully) respond to the 
challenge, then they must do so by addressing the explanation, which requires a more substantive 
and intellectual line of thought and communication. Consequently, by utilizing this mode of 
expression, one can effectively ‘raise the level of discourse’ and possibly come closer to 
invoking the target moral or social change, as it forces the parties involved to reflect.42 
A last way in which ritual can accommodate moral anger is simply to strive to embody 
and express the moral ideal that has been affronted. In so doing, one is able to both respond to 
the source of the immorality, injustice, or general moral transgression as well as productively 
work through the anger felt. Moreover, one is able to actively work toward setting right the 
situation through one’s own agency, as actively being a morally good person requires one to act 
against immorality or injustice. To achieve this, from the Confucian perspective, requires that 
one exemplify ritual performance in general. This is because, according to the Confucians, 
sincere ritual practice simply does embody and express moral righteousness (e.g., Analects 
15.18/43/11; Xunzi 19/93/23-19/94/1, 19/94/8). If moral anger motivates one to work toward 
moral rectification, then certainly this is the best way to achieve that end while exercising one’s 
anger. In this way, one goes on to perform an analogue of what the exemplar kings themselves 
did, displaying anger through a courageous righteousness. 
Are there modern examples of ritual being used in such a manner? An interesting case is 
made by David Kertzer that certain funeral rituals in South Africa can be construed as 
expressions of moral outrage against Apartheid. Detailing one such event, Kertzer writes: 
On April 13 [1985] …a mass funeral was held for twenty-seven blacks—many of 
them youths—killed by police. Most of the victims had been killed when police 
opened fire on mourners who had gathered for a previous funeral. The sixty 
thousand participants in the rite… “mixed solemnity with politics, mourning with 
exhortation and clenched fists with the soft swelling of African singing.” The 
coffins were draped in the black, green, and gold colors of the outlawed African 
National Congress. Emotions ran high. (Kertzer 1988, 171) 
This ritual was not merely for the purgation of grief and impotent outrage, nor was it simply to 
offer condolence or remembrance. The ritual cultivated the moral anger of the people and 
transformed it into action. As Kertzer goes on to note, the mass funeral allowed the people to not 
only unify in their anger, but to demonstrate a shared identity and the possibility of a new 
national leadership (Ibid., 172). In other words, the mass funeral served as more than just an 
expression of moral anger, but the application of that anger to help launch genuine opposition to 
their oppressors. This exemplifies the harnessing of moral anger into ritual and then using said 
ritual for (or toward) the enactment of positive moral change.43 
 To reiterate, the Confucians regard anger as one of the most difficult dispositions that 
humans possess, and one that can easily be turned to violent, immoral ends. At the same time, 
being a natural disposition means that anger warrants care and attention and, moreover, can even 
be coopted in the service of attaining the moral ends toward which the person of noble character 
aims. As I have shown, one way of achieving moral aims through anger is to make use of ritual 
prescriptions to both express and work through one’s anger, as well as harness that anger for the 
purpose of positive moral and sociopolitical change. 
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1 It is noteworthy that, for the Confucians, even what are often thought of as positive dispositions 
(e.g., joy, affection, and happiness) can become disruptive in terms of how they influence or 
distort judgement, behavior, and relationships. Rather than attempt to cut off such feelings, 
however, the Confucians argue that it is better to find means of accommodating them, placing 
the Confucians in interesting opposition to (among others) the Stoics, who begin with similar 
premises and yet reached different conclusions. 
2 There is a concern about cross-cultural (and cross-temporal) identification of emotions. To 
clarify, I am not assuming that nu is necessarily equivalent to what most readers will construe as 
anger. Rather, I offer up an interpretation of the Confucian notion of anger, its treatment in the 
 
literature, and how both the concept and its enactment bear on contemporary ethical issues. 
Similar considerations apply to all other emotions/feelings discussed herein. 
3 ICS concordance numbers are used where possible for all citations from classical Chinese texts. 
Conventional passage numbers are also provided for the Mengzi. Translations are my own unless 
otherwise indicated, and I am thankful to Eric Hutton for a number of important corrections. 
4 Mengzi’s admonitions here, and others like them, are congruent with the valuation of familial 
relationships that is notably prominent in Confucianism. Early in the Analects, for example, filial 
piety is listed as the root of benevolence (1.2/1/6-7). For concerns about how family can be 
jeopardized by anger, see Analects 12.21/33/1-3. 
5 Xunzi additionally idealizes ministers and generals who are unable to be provoked by anger 
(Xunzi 15/71/4).  
6 See, for example, Analects 12.1/30/17: “Restraining oneself and according with ritual propriety 
constitutes humaneness.” I will elaborate on the role of ritual in moral goodness later in this 
essay. 
7 Scholars familiar with the work of Mengzi may object that the thinker does not depict anger as 
being a key feature or “sprout” of human nature. While this may muddy anger’s place in 
Mengzi’s philosophy, he still seems to regard anger as a feeling that can and does occur 
naturally, and so I will not treat him as an outlier among early Confucian thought on the topic. 
8 Discussion with Joonho Lee was most helpful in formulating this distinction. 
9 For a recent review and critique of scholars advancing such interpretations, see Zhang 2015. 
10 A quick note: throughout the text I occasionally make mention of “righteous” attitudes, but I 
opt to depict anger as “moral anger” or “promoral anger” rather than necessarily as righteous 
anger. I do this to avoid (as much as possible) conflation of moral anger with the concept and 
 
disposition of righteousness (yi 義) often referenced in Confucian texts. While I suspect that 
moral(ized) anger and yi at least can fit together in the classical Confucian context, and perhaps 
often do, they are not depicted as practically or logically equivalent or entailing one another. As 
such, I err on the side of caution with my diction. I am appreciative of Andrew Ruble for helping 
me to explain this point. 
11 Consequently, it is arguable that the Confucian notion of harmony, at least as I understand it 
here, is not a state devoid of what we might think of as disruptive feelings; rather, it involves the 
appropriate channeling and application of these feelings so that they do not become disruptive or 
result in disruptive behavior or action. My thanks to Eirik Harris for pressing me on this issue. 
12 For example, Xunzi’s list of natural dispositions includes liking (hao 好), disgust (wu 惡), joy 
(xi 喜), anger (nu 怒), sorrow (ai 哀), and happiness (le 樂) (Xunzi 22/107/23). 
13 Interested scholars may also attend to the “Liyun” chapter of the Liji, which provides an 
elaboration of the so-called “seven feelings” (qi qing 七情) for later Confucian thought. This list 
notably includes anger (nu) alongside joy (xi 喜), sadness (ai 哀), fear (ju 懼), love (ai 愛), 
aversion (wu 惡), and desire (yu 欲). 
14 This seems to have been an ancient mode of thought and one that the Confucians often 
associated with both filial piety (xiao 孝) and a more general notion of personal flourishing. See, 
for example, Analects 2.6/3/9. 
15 Though not at the expense of moral values or commitments (e.g., Mengzi 6A14, 11.14/60/14-
19) 
16 A similar remark appears in the Liji (“Yueji 樂記” passage 49) 
 
17 To clarify, I am focusing exclusively on the Confucian appeal to ritual in this project as a way 
of engaging with anger in a moral manner. This is not to suggest that the Confucians looked at 
ritual as the only resource by which anger could be coopted for moral ends, though (e.g., Mengzi 
makes a number of remarks about how humans have promoral core dispositions that can be used 
to rein in feelings like anger, and Xunzi suggests that a sense of approbation, once tutored, can 
also help to appropriately guide motivating feelings like anger). My thanks to Gordon Mower for 
recommending this addition. 
18 See, for example, Xunzi 10/43/1-3: In ritual, noble and lowly are ranked, old and young are 
differentiated, poor and rich, casual and grave, all of these are distinguished…Virtue must be 
accorded position, position must be accorded prosperity, and prosperity must be accorded use. 
19 See in particular Xunzi Book 19, “On Ritual” (Lilun 禮論).  
20 I here draw from Sin-yee Chan’s (2006) interpretation of the related concept of respect (jing 
敬) in Confucianism. 
21 For first use of this description, see Lewis 2018. For an extended defense of this reading, see 
Lewis forthcoming. 
22 A similar sentiment appears in Analects 16.13/47/3-9. 
23 Of course, this may be unintentional, but the implication seems to be that a teacher’s 
frustration with such cases is inevitable and that this can set a foundation for anger. 
24 Mengzi says relatively little on the topic of ritual education. 
25 Bockover 2012, Lewis forthcoming, Li 2007, and Nam 2014 also employ analogies between 
language and ritual. 
26 Xunzi 19/98/3-7, Hutton trans., p. 215. 
 
27 The Liji, for example, details directions for coordinating the military with anger (e.g., Qu Li 
Shang, passage 69). 
28 Of particular note are Xunzi’s remarks on the rites of mourning and sacrifice detailed in Xunzi 
19/95/17-18 and Xunzi 19/97/20-19/98/3. 
29 Cantrell notes that James Jasper’s (2011) work on emotion includes a “taxonomy” of anger 
that distinguishes moral anger from destructive, reflexive anger (Cantrell 2019, pp. 11-12). 
Cantrell ultimately concludes, however, that “anger is caustic and too often brings about change 
that requires one group to benefit at the intentional expense of another group” (Ibid, p. 33) and 
that it is therefore unsafe as a resource. 
30 Michael Ing suggests that resentment is a form of anger; Winnie Sung argues that the two are 
conceptually distinct. 
31 Ing here cites Xunzi: “Those who understand themselves do not resent others. Those who 
understand their lot in life do not resent tian (heaven)” (Xunzi 4/13/19; cited in Ing 2016, p. 20). 
32 Sung interprets the Confucians as claiming that, when one is resentful, one objectifies oneself 
into a passive stance and become fixated, preventing one from realizing genuine benevolence 
and moral propriety. The early Confucians do criticize fixation and caution learners against 
becoming ‘“stuck,” so to speak, so Sung’s interpretation is plausible, though it may not be the 
primary or exclusive rationale behind the general discomfort with resentment. 
33 Ing offers a more specific instance of appropriate resentment, suggesting that it applies in 
cases where “those close to us take advantage of the vulnerability necessary for entering into 
meaningful relationships rooted in care” (2016, 24) and citing the appropriateness of resentment 
toward family who commit serious grievances detailed in Mengzi 6B3 (12.3/62/25-12.3/63/8). 
 
That is to say, resentment is appropriate when care, in some form, is withheld by those one 
considers intimately close; it is effectively a response to a special kind of betrayal. 
34 Hagop Sarkissian (forthcoming) offers a similar analysis of the role of contempt (wu 惡) in 
Confucianism. Like resentment, contempt is undesirable due to its propensity for generating 
antisocial inclinations, but it also serves an important role in detecting and rectifying moral 
wrongs (e.g., Analects 4.3/7/9: “Only one who is humane is [truly] able to love people, is [truly] 
able to despise people”). 
35 Cantrell’s characterization of “fierce love” is not entirely precise, but suggests that one ties a 
sense of ferocity (perhaps referring to a particular motive force) not to anger, which is injury-
oriented, but to love, which is unity- and dignity-oriented, and is committed to a proposition that 
“none in humanity rises until all rise“ (2019, p. 26). 
36 Again, and reiterating my earlier note, this is not to suggest that the ancient Confucians 
necessarily had the same notion of anger as, say, persons living in the contemporary United 
States of America. Rather, my point is that this notion of anger is at least relevantly similar to 
more proximate treatments of anger, and that the Confucian ritual method for the promoral 
enactment of anger may be (and likely is) translatable into current circumstances. 
37 See again Xunzi 19/97/20-19/98/3. 
38 My thanks to Joshua de Bonilla for this example. 
39 Similarly, one is encouraged to remonstrate with friends in error as well (Analects 
12.23/33/15). One is also advised, however, to give up the attempt if the friend refuses advice, 
lest one be dragged down with them. 
40 See, for example, the depiction of TRC aims at https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/ and 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/faqs-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-1.699883. 
 
41 For further argumentation for this point, Paul Muldoon (2008) provides an excellent (and 
recent) elaboration. 
42 Of course, it is possible that this approach could just as easily result in further entrenchment in 
the problematic position(s) that have given rise to conflict. The Confucians traditionally would 
have advocated a more comprehensive moral education to ameliorate this sort of worry, but I 
acknowledge that, in modernity, there may not be available recourse to such a resource. Then 
again, my argument was never that such means are foolproof, and I suspect that it is preferable to 
offer some means of handling moral anger than no means at all. 
43 As Nalei Chen has pointed out to me, this also raises a number of interesting questions about 
expressions of anger and political power dynamics, such as how governments ought to respond 
to the anger of their citizens (e.g., as expressed by protest) and how a ritualized structure might 
help to facilitate progressive dialogue between government and citizenry in such cases. While I 
do not have the space to explore such cases here, I hope to do so in future projects. 
